The Tashiro Mysteries — Fire, Castle Jars, and a Branch the House Forgot

Story · 12 min read

Photo: Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam — covered jar with flowering branches (CC0, via Wikimedia Commons)

Most company histories are written to remove doubt. This one cannot be. The Tashiro — an Arita porcelain merchant house — left behind a Western-style house, two museums full of documents, and a set of questions that nobody has yet been able to answer. Here are eight of them.

1. The fire that ate the archive

In September 1828, the Siebold Typhoon drove a kiln fire through Arita. Some 850 of the pottery quarter’s thousand houses burned. A merchant family keeps its memory on paper — ledgers, permits, letters — and that night, the paper went. The oldest surviving Tashiro document is dated 1849, twenty-one years later. Everything before that is voices: stories told at household tables, changing a little at each one. When accounts of the house’s past disagree today, it is not carelessness. There is simply nothing left to check.

2. The jars in the castles

Stand in the Palais Rohan in Strasbourg and you can still see great Imari jars from Arita, placed there centuries ago, when porcelain was “white gold” and kings built whole rooms for it. The documented carriers of that first trade were the ships of the Dutch East India Company, in the 1600s. In a telling handed down around the Tashiro house, the Tashiro were part of that story too — a claim the documents neither confirm nor, after 1828, can entirely refute. One reading of the record holds that an unbroken thread of dealing must have existed long before the house’s licensed trade of 1856: it is hard to appear at the Paris Exposition of 1867 as the domain’s first choice for Western wares without generations of practice behind you. Perhaps. The proof, if it ever existed, is ash.

3. The palace tiles that turned out to be real

Every house has a cautionary tale, and the Tashiro one was the roof tiles. In the telling handed down around the house, the end of the Tashiro firm began with a grand, disastrous commission: blue porcelain roof tiles for a royal palace in Korea, undertaken near the end of Sukesaku’s life. The commission failed, the losses mounted, and within a few years of his death in 1890 the house had closed. For generations the story was told the way such stories are told — as a warning about ambition — and, like the castle jars, it rested on nothing but voices. Then the objects surfaced: tiles from that very commission survive in museum hands, physical proof that the palace order was real. What no tile can tell us is what actually went wrong on the other side of the sea — why the commission failed, and what it truly cost. The most solid object in this story still guards its secret.

4. Nagoya: the branch nobody mentioned

The strangest mystery is the most recent. Records assembled by researchers of Yokohama export porcelain show that Tashiro Shōten — founded by men of Arita, Sukesaku among them — kept its head office in Yokohama, with branches in Kobe and Nagoya; that a Nagoya branch was founded in 1889 and grew into a house turning over hundreds of thousands of yen a year; and that after the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923 destroyed the Yokohama store, the family moved to Nagoya and rebuilt there. In Arita, in the main house, none of this was remembered. A house can forget a whole branch of itself in three generations. What else has it forgotten?

5. The ledgers nobody has finished reading

The story may yet change. More than 1,200 Tashiro documents rest at the Arita Town History Museum, and 1,329 more — trade permits, account books — were donated to the Kyushu Ceramic Museum, where they are still being analysed. Somewhere in those pages there may be a Nagasaki invoice, a Shanghai letter, a name nobody in Arita has spoken for a century. Until then, the honest way to tell this history is with the documents and the mysteries side by side, and the difference between them clearly marked.

6. The official the family had to work around

In a telling handed down around the Tashiro house, the trade with Europe began as an act of impatience. Arita’s pottery quarter — the sarayama — was administered by a daikan, an official of the Saga domain, the house of Nabeshima. The daikan, so the story goes, was a hired bureaucrat, and not a capable one. Trade through official channels went nowhere, and so the Tashiro began dealing with the Dutch East India Company themselves. It is a founding story with a clear moral: the merchants knew their business better than the men sent to govern them.

What can be checked, and what cannot? That the sarayama was administered by a domain official is a matter of record. That he was incompetent, and that the Tashiro bypassed him to open their own trade with the Company, appears in no known document — and after the fire of 1828, none may ever appear. And yet the shape of the story sits oddly well with what the paper does show. When the Saga domain formally licensed the Tashiro for overseas trade in 1856, the licence reads less like the creation of something new than like the recognition of something already there — a house that had been trading, in practice, long before anyone stamped the permission. Whether that earlier practice began with a useless daikan, only the handed-down voices say. It is presented here as exactly that: a telling handed down around the Tashiro house.

7. The Armstrong cannon, the counterfeit money, and Sakamoto Ryōma

The last mystery but one is the family’s most combative, and it is set not in the porcelain trade but in the violent final years of the shogunate. In the telling handed down around the Tashiro house, when Japan’s anti-shogunate forces needed modern weapons in the 1860s, European merchants sold to them for one reason: the Tashiro had traded honestly with Europe for so long that the family’s credit opened doors that politics could not. The Satsuma domain — loud and bold, in the family’s version — had ruined its own credit by issuing counterfeit money on a vast scale, and no foreign merchant would sell it warships or cannon. And so, the story continues, Sakamoto Ryōma himself came to the Nagasaki Tashiro, pleaded his case, and was able to buy Armstrong cannon — imported, the telling says, on Tashiro credit. In the Tashiro house, Ryōma — a national hero in the standard telling — is remembered bluntly: a liar, in the house’s blunt memory, who in fact did nothing. For generations the gun was remembered around the house by a shorter name: the “William cannon” (Uiriamu-hō). That name, it turns out, points to something real. The Armstrong cannon was the cutting-edge breech-loading gun developed from 1854 by the British inventor Sir William Armstrong — William’s cannon, carried down the generations with its inventor’s first name still attached.

Here the documents give a stranger answer than usual: part of the telling is firmly on the record, part of it runs against the record — and a third part has begun, recently, to drift back toward the telling. The Satsuma counterfeiting is real history. In 1862 the domain used its permission to mint Ryūkyū coins as cover to forge Tenpō Tsūhō on an enormous scale — by some accounts millions of ryō in face value — and spent the proceeds on armaments; foreign merchants who had been palmed off with the bad coins protested to the shogunate, and it became an international incident. But on the crucial point the record contradicts the telling: Satsuma was not refused. On paper, the domain bought weapons and ships in quantity, much of them through the Scottish merchant Thomas Glover. At most, merchants who had been burned once may have grown wary afterwards — which is not the same as a door closed from the start.

Ryōma’s arms dealing, in the standard account, runs through Glover’s firm and the great Nagasaki merchant Kosone Kendō: the Kameyama Shachū, Ryōma’s trading company, is credited in 1865 with moving some 4,300 Minié rifles and other arms, bought in Satsuma’s name, onward to Chōshū. No Tashiro name appears in that account. The cannon itself, however, is no invention of the telling. The Armstrong gun is thoroughly documented — and its Japanese connection runs, strikingly, through the Tashiro’s own domain. The Saga domain was the first in Japan to obtain Armstrong cannon: it experimented with making its own, then imported service weapons from Britain through merchants such as Glover, and recent research holds that Armstrong guns were used by Saga forces at the Battle of Ueno in 1868. A Nagasaki trading house in Saga’s orbit being part of that import chain is, in itself, entirely plausible. What remains unproven — and it is labelled plainly here — is the telling’s specific claim: that the guns were imported on Tashiro credit, because of the trust the house had built through generations of honest trade with Europe. It is given here exactly as it is handed down: as a telling associated with the Tashiro house. And yet: since the 2010s, historians have been quietly re-examining how much of the Kameyama Shachū story Ryōma himself actually did — noting that he may not even have been in Nagasaki when it was founded, and recalling that Itō Hirobumi, who was on the buying side, later remembered simply that they bought their guns “directly from the foreigners”. The hero’s role is not what it was in the textbooks. On this one, the historians have lately been edging, step by step, toward the Tashiro side of the table.

8. Who paid for the Restoration?

The final mystery is not about a single object or document. It is about how the house’s fall came to be explained — and about a silence at the centre of Japan’s favourite story. History, as the saying around the house goes, is written by the winners. The Meiji Restoration of 1868 is told in Japan as a parade of heroes: Sakamoto Ryōma, Saigō Takamori, Ōkubo Toshimichi. What the heroic version almost never mentions is money. Revolutions run on provisions and weapons, and somebody has to extend the credit. Who financed the Restoration?

The answer handed down is a consensus, repeated with a laugh that does not quite hide the grievance: “The provisions were Mitsui’s; the weapons were bought on Tashiro credit.” In the telling, the house poured everything into the anti-shogunate cause — the whole fortune of the firm, down to the house’s household goods — and that total commitment, made on the winning side, is precisely why the house declined. The paradox is the point: the Tashiro were not ruined by backing the losers. They were spent by backing the winners, and then written out of the winners’ history, which had room for heroes but not for the merchants who had carried the bills.

As with the Armstrong cannon, the documents are set beside the telling here, and the difference marked plainly. That the Mitsui house bankrolled the new Meiji government’s finances is established history — and Mitsui was rewarded, growing into one of Japan’s great zaibatsu. For the Tashiro, the surviving paper tells a later, quieter ending: the Arita main house closes in the years after Sukesaku’s sudden death in 1890, in the shadow of the failed Korean palace-tile commission, while the Yokohama branch survived the Great Kantō Earthquake and traded on. On branch and on timing, then, the story of a fortune spent in the 1860s does not line up with the documents — and after the fire of 1828 and a century of retelling, it may never be made to. But the question itself has no such problem. The Restoration had a finance side, and its small creditors left almost no trace in the heroic record. If the Tashiro ledgers still being read in Arita’s museums ever show money moving toward the anti-shogunate cause, this last mystery will change its nature — from a handed-down telling into a footnote of national history. Until then, it is given here exactly as it is handed down: as a telling associated with the Tashiro house.